Does InviziPoll read individual poll answers on the server?

No. Responses are encrypted in the respondent browser; our servers store ciphertext. Aggregate insights are produced without exposing individual plaintext answers to operators.

How is this different from “anonymous mode” toggles elsewhere?

Architectural: ciphertext-only persistence is the default boundary for poll payloads - not only a UI label. Always validate third‑party docs for each vendor you evaluate.

What about telemetry on marketing pages?

Public marketing pages use first‑party, cookieless aggregate analytics - separate from respondent flows. See /privacy for detail.

Respondent anonymity

Why ciphertext-only storage matters for sensitive polls

Many tools advertise “anonymous surveys.” InviziPoll separates marketing language from architecture: poll responses are encrypted in the respondent's browser before they reach us, and servers persist ciphertext - not identifiable answers.

Client-side encryptionCiphertext-only storagek-anonymity guardrailsCookieless respondent flows

respondent.invizipoll.com - encrypting response

Respondent browser

PLAINTEXT

How likely are you to recommend this workplace?

Very likely

Likely

Neutral

ML-KEM-768

What we store

CIPHERTEXT

51ae14076884e5134d3afcdee845fadb 72b05dfd164a0f529a92d827f32fdf37 29e233e7d123615675901ace745a9ebc 363dc54b8d771905007e8e29b492a416 7b16c09f1c3cd2f46b2e93038669ec55 c98bdd30d589703dc13dfb9271b912fa 074cf498175293d292634177e0599581

Decrypted in authorized client · aggregate only

What operators see

AGGREGATE

Very likely58%

Likely27%

Neutral11%

n = 147identities: never persisted

BLUF: Bottom line up front

What can operators see?

Workspace admins decrypt aggregate analytics in authorized clients using keys they control. Individual responses are not readable by InviziPoll operators as part of normal service delivery - the ciphertext boundary is described in our Security hub and encryption docs (linked below).

Admins can decrypt

aggregate charts
results computed client-side with their own keys
cohorts above the k-anonymity threshold

Operators cannot read

any individual response in the clear
respondent identity/IP/device
a mapping from an answer back to a person

The honest caveats

Cryptography is necessary, not sufficient

Technical controls set the boundary; process and questionnaire design protect it in practice.

Re-identification risk is a process problem too

Cryptography cannot stop a survey author from asking identifiable questions (“Submit your desk number”). Pair technical controls with sensible questionnaire design and HR policies - the same discipline required for any feedback channel.

GUIDANCE · questionnaire review before launch

Marketing telemetry vs respondent flows

Public marketing pages run first‑party, cookieless analytics for aggregate traffic only. Respondent ballot pages follow the ZeroTelemetry-style posture documented in our Privacy Policy - never mix the two when evaluating vendors.

POSTURE · ballot pages ≠ marketing pages

Verify the boundary

Questions

Does InviziPoll read individual poll answers on the server?: No. Responses are encrypted in the respondent browser; our servers store ciphertext. Aggregate insights are produced without exposing individual plaintext answers to operators.
How is this different from “anonymous mode” toggles elsewhere?: Architectural: ciphertext-only persistence is the default boundary for poll payloads - not only a UI label. Always validate third‑party docs for each vendor you evaluate.
What about telemetry on marketing pages?: Public marketing pages use first‑party, cookieless aggregate analytics - separate from respondent flows. See /privacy for detail.

Ask the questions people won't answer out loud.

Start a workspace and publish polls where architecture (not adjectives) protects respondent anonymity.

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